

Summary of the November 4 Briefing of the Clark Task Force and Staff

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1015 . . . Personnel [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] outlined the organization and functions of the Personnel Staff. He briefly covered the Career Service Program and CIA recruitment problems.

1030 . . . Clandestine Activities Mr. Frank Wisner

Mr. Wisner outlined the organization of the Clandestine Services and briefly stated the functions of each component unit. He discussed the history and background of the Clandestine Services, including OSS, the National Defense Act of 1947, NSCID 5, NSC 10/2, and NSC 5412. Mr. Wisner read his prepared notes (prepared by [REDACTED] omitting only those portions dealing with Command Relations. He, also, raised the problem of "Agreed Activities".

Mr. Wisner commented that we were not inexperienced, uncontrolled and free-wheeling, but that we closely followed NSC directives and did check out our operations in the field with either the Senior Military Commander or the Senior Political person there. He added that respect for the Agency is growing both in the military and in the Department of State.

Mr. Wisner then discussed some of the current "hot spots" where we are concentrating our efforts including [REDACTED]

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1145. . . Mr. Bannerman discussed the functions of the various components of the Security Staff.

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Mr. Helms outlined the existing relations we have with the

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Mr. Helms terminated his briefing by describing how the Agency operates in the counter-espionage field.

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1250. . . Mr. Dulles announced that he had received a call from General Clark and that the arrangement suggested by him (Mr. Dulles) concerning the investigation of the Clandestine Services was accepted. He stated that the report of the Special Study Group, which he had in his safe, would be made available to the Special Sub-Task Force which would handle this matter.

Mr. Dulles assured the group that the Agency was fully prepared to cooperate with them to the utmost and suggested that some of the members visit some of our overseas installations.

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Task Force

General Mark Clark
Admiral Richard Conolly
Captain Edward Rickenbacker

Mr. Donald Russell
Mr. Ernest Hollings
Mr. Kearns

Staff

General James Christiansen
Colonel John Dubbelde
Colonel Herman Lane

CIA Personnel Present

Mr. Allen Dulles (Part time)
General C. P. Cabell
Mr. Robert Amery
Mr. Sherman Kent
Colonel Stanley Grogan

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Colonel Lawrence White
Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick
Mr. George C. Carey

Briefing

1430

Organisations of CIA

Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick

Mr. Kirkpatrick gave a complete run-down of the entire Agency with a short statement of the functions of each component. He included the number of people employed in each unit. Personnel figures for the DD/P side were given as follows:



1500

Relations with the Military

General C. P. Cabell

General Cabell covered seven general topics as follows:

(1) Collaboration with the Military in the Collection, Production and Coordination of Intelligence.

(2) Provision of Military Personnel to serve with CIA.

(3)

(4) Supply and Services Assistance.

(5) War Planning with the Military.

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(7) Outstanding Problems not yet resolved.

With regard to the Command Relationships arrangement General Cabell lightly covered the paper stating that -- "under this Command Relationship Paper, CIA will have in each theater a CIA force which maintains its organizational integrity. The CIA Commander becomes a subordinate commander and staff officer of the military theater commander. The CIA Commander and his force will receive only such direction and support from Washington, as is comparable to the direction and support furnished the Army, Navy and Air Forces of the theater, from their Washington Headquarters.

General Cabell outlined some of the wartime missions of CIA stating we must be able to do the following:

Conduct behind-the-lines sabotage.

Operate escape and evasion lines.

Guerrilla Warfare.

Such other clandestine activities as may be beyond the range, capability or mission of the military forces.

General Cabell terminated his briefing with a short description of our Outstanding problems as yet unresolved. These included

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(2) Working up of realistic military requirements for unconventional warfare support by CIA to the theaters, post D-Day.

(3) The major unresolved problem -- "Agreed Activities". The problem is that by NSCID-5 CIA has the responsibility for foreign espionage and counterespionage except for certain "agreed activities" by other agencies. To date there has been no meeting of the minds as to what these agreed activities are and how they should be conducted. General Cabell remarked that the risk of harm befalling overall U.S. intelligence due to these uncoordi-

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General Cabell went on to explain relationship between CIA and the theater commander and between CIA and U.S. Ambassadors overseas.

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National Intelligence ProductionMr. Robert Amery

Mr. Amery outlined the membership and functioning of the IAC and then explained somewhat in detail the production of intelligence, including the roles played by ORR and OSI.

1600

Coffee Break

1615

National EstimatesMr. Sherman Kent

Mr. Kent outlined the process of creation of a routine National Intelligence Estimate. He briefly described the following points in the process:

- (1) Initiation
- (2) Terms of Reference
- (3) Drafting
- (4) Inter-Agency Consultation
- (5) IAC Action
- (6) Post Mortem Procedures

At the termination of Mr. Kent's briefing General Clark remarked that this was the type of report that any theater commander would desire. He inquired as to the reason he had never seen a single NIE while in Korea. General Cabell remarked that they were supplied but that possibly they never went beyond certain senior members of his staff.

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Mr. Allen Dulles

Mr. Dulles apologized for his tardiness stating that he had just returned from an OCB meeting. Mr. Dulles outlined for the Group the functioning and make-up

of the OCB stating that it also served as a clearing house for many of our operations.

Mr. Dulles remarked that we are attempting to fight the Communist menace in every way possible. He described some of the Communist Front Organizations including the World Federation of Trade Union stating that we are attempting to counteract them by [REDACTED] He briefly referred to the [REDACTED] 25X1C

Mr. Dulles remarked that he was more hopeful today with the situation in the satellites then he was two years ago. He stated that our operations are having a great impact and one in particular -- [REDACTED] 25X1C

[REDACTED] is very effective. He made a brief reference to the [REDACTED] 25X1C operating into Far Eastern Countries.

Mr. Dulles then stated that one of our major problems was that of Agreed Activities. General Clark remarked that he was aware of this problem and would like a full briefing on it in the future. General Cabell stated that this would be forthcoming.

General Clark further commented that he had discussed the Chinese raiding problem with General Chase who was anxious to take over this authority. General Cabell commented that perhaps General Clark could assist us in the final resolution.

Mr. Dulles stated the work of CIA would be more effective if we had a closer liaison with the military so that at a time of crisis we could draw from them experts in various fields to do special jobs for us. He remarked that we have a series of organizational problems that we would like to take up with the Group including that of Career Service; Salary level; Fringe benefits, etc.

Mr. Dulles questioned General Clark as to the manner in which he would like to continue the briefings.

General Clark stated that he was separating his Task Force into Sub-Task Forces with one of the principals serving as a Sub-Task Force Commander. He stated that these Sub-Task Forces would respectively look into the Intelligence Activities of the Army, State, Navy, and CIA. He added that --- "If we decide to look into the covert business -- I will head that sub-task force inasmuch as I am already fairly well acquainted with some of it".

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He added that some meetings would be held in Charleston and that the Group should hear various people who could contribute to the investigation including General MacArthur and General Willoughby.

Briefing adjourned at 1800 hours.

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Briefing for the General Clark Task Force and Staff; 3 November 1954

DCI Conference Room
1500 hours

General C. P. Cabell

RELATIONS WITH DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AND MILITARY SERVICES

1. Collaboration with Military in the Collection, Production and Coordination of Intelligence.
2. Provision of Military Personnel to Serve with CIA.
3. [REDACTED] 25X1C
4. Supply and Services Assistance.
5. War Planning with Military.
6. Liaison.
7. Outstanding problems not resolved.

1. Collaboration with Military in the Collection, Production and Coordination of Intelligence.

In this area we have well developed and continuously used procedures to effect the collaboration. These begin with directives from the NSC known as NSCID's which set the broad basis. Implementing directives to the NSCID's are issued in the form of DCID's -- after approval by the IAC.

The IAC is the organ used for coordination, whether it be of Collection or Production, or Intelligence Policy. It is chaired by the DCI and its members are:

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant for Intelligence,

Department of State.

Major General Arthur G. Trudeau, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,

Department of the Army.

Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe, Director of Naval Intelligence,

Department of the Navy.

Major General John A. Samford, Director of Intelligence,

Headquarters, United States Air Force.

Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff.

Mr. Harry S. Trayner, Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC.

Mr. Ralph R. Reach, Acting for Assistant to the Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

It is an extremely active and effective committee. Mr. Amory will discuss it in more detail later.

2. Provision of Military Personnel to Serve with CIA.

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We have about [redacted] military personnel assigned to CIA. This represents about [redacted] of our overall assigned strength. This proportion is not a "magic" one but my observations confirm this as being about the right mixture under cold war conditions, of civilian and military in our Agency -- which I look upon as properly being essentially a civilian organization.

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Aside from the necessity for having certain skills unique to the military, it appears healthy to have an admixture of military and civilian talents, points of view, and traditions as well as having available uniformed people to call on to do a job where a uniform offers an operational advantage.

As you go through the organization you will find instances where a study of a particular job would not show a requirement for a military man -- yet a military man might be filling it. This you will find to be the exceptional case. But -- if you look a little further you will find that position to be a convenient one for the injection of these other desirable factors I mentioned -- to leaven the group of employees, although the officer himself may not recognize this.

A most important consideration is the development of mutual understanding and confidence between this Agency and the Military. This admixture of personnel plays a major role in the establishment and maintenance of that confidence.

Besides these active military personnel we have a large number of Reserve Officers, and other former military men as well as a few Retired officers.

You will note that certain key positions are filled by Retired Officers. These officers have made and are making major contributions to the Agency and we value them highly.

We have a major problem with respect to our active duty officers. In the first place we want only those officers who are at least not unwilling to serve with us --

however, we sometimes get officers not enthusiastic about their assignment.

For all of them we have the obligation to do all in our power to ensure that their careers are not adversely affected. We are giving every attention to the rendition of Efficiency Reports so as to make them constructive. That is often very difficult due to the sensitive nature of the duty performed.

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4. Supply and Services Assistance.

We have excellent relations with the Military Services in our mutual logistical problems. We rely upon them for such needs as we have in equipment which is peculiar to the military. This is handled on both an outright purchase basis and also on a loan basis, but with reimbursement of such cost or such loan. I particularly have in mind some of our relations with the Air Force.

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In ~~the~~ small arms, particularly in individual equipment of the soldier, we have

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had excellent help

In turn, we furnish the military services with certain items of specialized equipment peculiar to our type of operations.

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Apropos of this, it is our policy not to duplicate the Research and Development of the Services in communications equipment.

We do not stockpile military items but rely upon the services to stockpile them for us. In turn, we have agreed to stockpile items peculiar to our job but which may be needed by them.

A good example that I can give you of the Services Assistance which we give and receive is in the field of communications.

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And by the way, by arrangement with the State Department, we are responsible for providing communications facilities from many of the Embassies to Washington.

5. War Planning with the Military.

CIA has a dual role to fulfill in its overseas operations in wartime. Not only must it continue to serve national-level policy, in both the intelligence and covert operation fields, but it must also support the military in the same fields to assist military operations.

Concerning wartime support by CIA to military operations, we have a basic agreement with the Department of Defense, which defines the wartime organizational relationships between the CIA and military theatre commanders. Under this

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Command Relationships Paper.

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War planning and preparation involve development by the military commands of their wartime requirements for operational action by CIA, including espionage, counter-espionage and covert operations; analysis by CIA of the potential of its current assets to meet such requirements; initiation by CIA of preparations to increase our wartime capabilities to meet these requirements; and preparatory pre-war action by CIA to establish organizations which, in the event of war, can accomplish the assigned mission.

We must be able to do the following:

- (1) Conduct behind-the-lines sabotage to impede an enemy advance.
- (2) Operate escape and evasion lines to exfiltrate military or other personnel from enemy territory.
- (3) Serve as cadres or focal points for expansion by the overt military forces into large scale resistance and guerrilla elements.
- (4) Conduct such other clandestine activities as may be beyond the range, capability, or mission of the military forces.

6. Liaison

CIA's liaison with the military is continuous, is at all levels, is cordial, and is effective. Furthermore, it is done without "Liaison Officers". We do not consider that the military personnel on duty with this Agency are in any sense

of the world, "Liaison Officers" to or from the Military Services. They are all workers who are expected to do no more or less liaison than their civilian associates.

Take my own case for example. I am not the "military" Deputy to the Director but am rather the Deputy to the Director. I was selected from the military in order to bring certain characteristics to the Executive direction of the Agency. I actually do less "liaisoning" than many of our civilians. There is one exception to this however in that I personally habitually attend the normal Friday meetings between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Senior officials from the State Dept. Only when I'm absent from the city do I send a substitute.

We come together with the Military on a number of boards and committees such as the "Operations Coordinating Board" of which you will hear more later, and

This letter is chaired by a CIA representative,

This summer when Sec. of Defense Wilson had his three day conference at Quantico, the Director was invited to attend. Actually I attended due to the absence of the Director from the city.

Periodically in this Agency we hold "Orientation Conferences" of several days duration for the benefit of recent employees and those returning from long overseas assignments. We have invited and received the attendance of numbers of Service Intelligence Officers.

All of these devices for "cross-fertilization" are, in our opinion, highly beneficial.

7. Outstanding Problems Not Resolved.

Naturally in dealing as we do with such complex issues and relationships, there are many day-to-day problems to be resolved. By and large these problems are faced-up to and satisfactorily settled as we go along.

There is one problem which has dragged along without definitive solution, after

the basic decisions have been made.

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Hence it has been agreed and directed that Defense assume the responsibility for them. The consummation of the passage is being delayed inordinately we believe because of minor difficulties.

Another problem which legitimately requires a longer time for solution is the working-up of realistic military requirements for unconventional warfare support by CIA to the theaters, post D-Day. We don't know of any practical way of moving any faster in that field.

The major unresolved problem with the military, and in particular with the Service Intelligence Agencies, is that of the so-called "Agreed Activities". This has dragged-on for years and is now becoming progressively acute. I merely want to alert you to the problem here today; you will hear more of it later.

The problem is this: By NSCID-5 issued in August, 1951, CIA was assigned the responsibility for: foreign espionage and counterespionage except for certain "agreed activities" by other agencies. To date there has been no meeting of the minds as to what these agreed activities are and how they should be conducted.

The Services are increasing their own facilities for such operations -- essentially, the clandestine collection of Intelligence by agents -- with inadequate arrangements for their coordination. The risk of harm befalling overall U.S. Intelligence due to these uncoordinated operations is becoming too great for comfort.

On 5 November the Director is holding a meeting with the Service Intelligence Chiefs to discuss our proposal of 24 June. The CIA position is: essentially to recognize that Theater Commanders may have requirements for clandestine collection. But -- such operations as they conduct must be coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence or his field representative. However, in the event that the Theater Commander considers that a particular action is immediately necessary for the security of his forces, or the accomplishment of his mission, and time does not permit referral to Washington, he is authorized to proceed pending resolution, even though the CIA Representative should consider it potentially harmful to the overall Intelligence effort.

We hope to make progress along these lines at Friday's meeting.

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
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Captain Edward Rickenbacker

Mr. Donald Russell
Mr. Ernest Hollings
Mr. Kearns


Staff

General James Christiansen
Colonel Herman Lane

Colonel John Dubbelde

CIA Personnel Present

Mr. Allen Dulles (Part time)
General C. P. Cabell
Mr. Robert Amory
Mr. Sherman Kent
Colonel Stanley Grogan

Colonel Lawrence White
Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick
Mr. George C. Carey


Briefing

1430

Organizations of CIA

Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick

Mr. Kirkpatrick gave a complete run-down of the entire Agency with a short statement of the functions of each component. He included the number of people employed in each unit. Personnel figures for the DD/P side were given as follows:



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Mr. Kent outlined the process of creation of a routine National Intelligence Estimate. He briefly described the following points in the process:

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DCI Conference Room
1500 hours

General C. P. Cabell

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Department of the Army.

Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe, Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy.

Major General John A. Samford, Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, United States Air Force.

Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, Deputy Director for
Intelligence, the Joint Staff.

Mr. Harry S. Traynor, Atomic Energy Commission
Representative to the IAC.

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Mr. Ralph R. Roach, Acting for Assistant to the Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

It is an extremely active and effective committee. Mr. Amory will discuss it in more detail later.

2. Provision of Military Personnel to Serve with CIA.

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
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
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


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A good example that I can give you of the Services Assistance which we give and receive is in the field of communications.



5. War Planning with the Military.

CIA has a dual role to fulfill in its overseas operations in wartime. Not only must it continue to serve national-level policy, in both the intelligence and covert operation fields, but it must also support the military in the same fields to assist military operations.

Concerning wartime support by CIA to military operations, we have a basic agreement with the Department of Defense, which defines the wartime organizational relationships between the CIA and military theatre commanders. Under this Command Relationships Paper, ^{25X1C}

25X1C

War planning and preparation involve development by the military commands of their wartime requirements for operational action by CIA, including espionage, counter-espionage and covert operations; analysis by CIA of the potential of its current assets to meet such requirements; initiation by CIA of preparations to increase our wartime capabilities to meet these requirements; and preparatory pre-war action by CIA to establish organizations which, in the event of war, can accomplish the assigned mission.

We must be able to do the following:

- (1) Conduct behind-the-lines sabotage to impede an enemy advance.
- (2) Operate escape and evasion lines to exfiltrate military or other personnel from enemy territory.
- (3) Serve as cadres or focal points for expansion by the overt military forces into large scale resistance and guerrilla elements.
- (4) Conduct such other clandestine activities as may be beyond the range, capability, or mission of the military forces.


6. Liaison

CIA's liaison with the military is continuous, is at all levels, is cordial, and is effective. Furthermore, it is done without "Liaison Officers". We do not consider that the military personnel on duty with this Agency are in any sense

of the world, "Liaison Officers" to or from the Military Services. They are all workers who are expected to do no more or less liaison than their civilian associates.

Take my own case for example. I am not the "military" Deputy to the Director but am rather the Deputy to the Director. I was selected from the military in order to bring certain characteristics to the Executive direction of the Agency. I actually do less "liaisoning" than many of our civilians. There is one exception to this however in that I personally habitually attend the normal Friday meetings between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Senior officials from the State Dept. Only when I'm absent from the city do I send a substitute.

We come together with the Military on a number of boards and committees such as the "Operations Coordinating Board" of which you will hear more later, and



This summer when Sec. of Defense Wilson had his three day conference at Quantico, the Director was invited to attend. Actually I attended due to the absence of the Director from the city.

Periodically in this Agency we hold "Orientation Conferences" of several days duration for the benefit of recent employees and those returning from long overseas assignments. We have invited and received the attendance of numbers of Service Intelligence Officers.

All of these devices for "cross-fertilization" are, in our opinion, highly beneficial.

7. Outstanding Problems Not Resolved.

Naturally in dealing as we do with such complex issues and relationships, there are many day-to-day problems to be resolved. By and large these problems are faced-up to and satisfactorily settled as we go along.

There is one problem which has dragged along without definitive solution, after the basic decisions have been made.



[REDACTED]

Hence it has been agreed and directed that Defense assume the responsibility for them. The consummation of the passage is being delayed inordinately we believe because of minor difficulties.

Another problem which legitimately requires a longer time for solution is the working-up of realistic military requirements for unconventional warfare support by CIA to the theaters, post D-Day. We don't know of any practical way of moving any faster in that field.

The major unresolved problem with the military, and in particular with the Service Intelligence Agencies, is that of the so-called "Agreed Activities". This has dragged-on for years and is now becoming progressively acute. I merely want to alert you to the problem here today; you will hear more of it later.

The problem is this: By NSCID-5 issued in August, 1951, CIA was assigned the responsibility for: foreign espionage and counterespionage except for certain "agreed activities" by other agencies. To date there has been no meeting of the minds as to what these agreed activities are and how they should be conducted.

The Services are increasing their own facilities for such operations -- essentially, the clandestine collection of Intelligence by agents -- with inadequate arrangements for their coordination. The risk of harm befalling overall U.S. Intelligence due to these uncoordinated operations is becoming too great for comfort.

On 5 November the Director is holding a meeting with the Service Intelligence Chiefs to discuss our proposal of 24 June. The CIA position is: essentially to recognize that Theater Commanders may have requirements for clandestine collection. But -- such operations as they conduct must be coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence or his field representative. However, in the event that the Theater Commander considers that a particular action is immediately necessary for the security of his forces, or the accomplishment of his mission, and time does not permit referral to Washington, he is authorized to proceed pending resolution, even though the CIA Representative should consider it potentially harmful to the overall Intelligence effort.

We hope to make progress along these lines at Friday's meeting.